An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These 'conformists' have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too. When there is asymmetric information about the distribution of preferences (the `social norm'), the incentive scheme offered or autonomy granted can reveal a principal's beliefs about that norm. High-powered incentives may crowd out motivation as pessimism about the norm is conveyed. But by choosing fixed wages or granting autonomy the principal may signal trust in a favorable social norm.
Introduction
Economists tend to believe that incentive contracts are bene…cial when most aspects of performance are measurable as they make employees work harder.
Indeed there are some recent empirical studies on single …rms showing that incentive contracts have raised productivity signi…cantly. 1 However, descriptive evidence on the limited overall frequency of use of pay-for-performance schemes may call for more caution. 2 Indeed there seem to be very di¤erent views in individual …rms on whether contracts based on individual performance are bene…cial or not. Whereas some see incentive contracts as an important component of their human resource management practices others take a much more sceptical view and even consider extrinsic incentives harmful. 3 Psychologists have for quite some time also taken a more sceptical view of extrinsic incentives. Since the work by Deci (1971) , it has often been pointed out that monetary incentives can be harmful as they may crowd-out intrinsic motivation. Numerous experimental studies have been conducted by psychologists on this issue producing somewhat mixed evidence. 4 But recently also economic experiments have raised doubts on this issue.
In laboratory experiments, for instance, Fehr and Gächter (2002) , Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2003) , Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) and Falk and Kosfeld (forthcoming) have observed that the ability to set incentives or a restriction of an agent's choice set made principals worse o¤ in contrast to theoretical predictions. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) found that weak monetary incentives led to reduced performance outcomes as compared to pure …xed compensation for tasks such as collecting for a charity.
But how can these results be reconciled with the economics of incentives? Kreps (1997) o¤ers an informal discussion of the topic and points out that understanding these issues involves activities unfamiliar to economists but concludes that "messy or not, they are important and must be pursued".
1 See for instance Lazear (2000) and the overviews provided by Gibbons (1997) or Prendergast (1999) .
2 Parent (2002) for instance surveys di¤erent samples of the US working population and …nds that at most one quarter of all employees receive some form of compensation based on individual performance. See also Parent and MacLeod (1999) .
3 See for instance Baron and Kreps (1999) Chapters 3 and 11. 4 Frey and Jegen (2001) and Kunz and Pfa¤ (2002) review the results of the psychological experiments and the psychologists' theoretical explanations from an economic perspective.
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We provide an economic explanation for motivation crowding-out e¤ects based on an extended social preference framework. In recent years a steadily growing economic literature has evolved modeling social preferences, i.e. the way in which individuals care for the well-being of others. Alternative utility functions have been proposed 5 that depart from standard homo oeconomicus assumptions. Many applications of these models quite successfully explain experimentally observed phenomena by assuming that two di¤erent types of agents exist in the population: some are strictly sel…sh while others are fair, i.e. care to some extent for the well-being of others.
We extend this by introducing a third group of agents who are in ‡uenced in their 'moral convictions'by what they think others will do. We assume that such conformists will be fair if and only if they think that a su¢ ciently high fraction of the other steadfast agents is fair as well. In this way we model the importance of social norms for individual decisions.
We investigate a basic framework in which a principal can choose whether to control or to trust an agent and afterwards the agent can exert e¤ort on a task. When the principal controls -for instance by setting incentivesshe can ensure that even sel…sh agents exert e¤ort. When she trusts she makes herself more vulnerable as her payo¤ depends to a larger extent on the agent's type.
But there is uncertainty about the type of the agent and the distribution of types in the population. The agent of course knows his own type but we assume that the principal has superior information about the type distribution due to her experience with previous employees. From this the explanation for a crowding-out e¤ect arises: By choosing to trust the agent the principal can signal her conviction that most people are fair. If this signal is credible, trust may indeed generate trustworthiness on the part of a conformist agent. On the other hand, when controlling the agent, she reveals her pessimism about the social norm and this may lead conformists to become sel…sh.
Two special cases of the basic framework are analyzed in more detail. In the …rst, an employer chooses between a …xed wage and an incentive scheme and we show that paying a …xed wage can indeed be a credible signal of trust even when performance-contingent wages would be optimal with symmetric information about the agent's type. In the second application, we consider the simple setup proposed by Falk and Kosfeld (forthcoming) where the principal can impose a restriction on the agent's e¤ort. It is shown that our framework yields a straightforward theoretical explanation for their striking experimental results.
But the decision to control or trust employees may also have an impact on the attractiveness of the job and therefore may alter the distribution of types in the organization. Therefore we also investigate these employee self-selection e¤ects of trust.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
Section 3 presents the basic framework. In Section 4 we analyze conditions under which trust is indeed a credible signal and the results from the general framework are then used to investigate two applications. In Section 5 we extend the model to study selection e¤ects of trust. Section 6 contains further extensions. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
Motivation crowding out has previously also been analyzed economically in Frey (1997) or Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) who allow for the possibility that an agent's disutility of e¤ort is increasing in the monetary reward for this e¤ort. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) assume that agents do not know their costs of e¤ort perfectly but that the principal has additional information about these e¤ort costs. Motivation crowding-out then occurs as the agent believes that the task is tedious when an incentive scheme is o¤ered. 6 Related to this, but from a di¤erent strand of the literature are models by Spier (1992) and Allen and Gale (1992) . Both show that incomplete …xed-payment contracts may be chosen in equilibrium as the contract o¤er can reveal information about the underlying technology. 7 Holmström and Milgrom (1991) show the optimality of …xed wages when an agent has to work on multiple tasks and the outcome of some important 6 Note that a precondition for their explanation is that an agent might like to perform the task. Our approach can explain motivation crowding-out even when agents dislike exerting e¤ort as for instance in typical principal-agent models and laboratory experiments where e¤ort was represented by a higher monetary expenditure by the agent.
7 In Spier (1992) a risk-averse principal has superior information about the pro…tabilty and risk of a technology. In Allen and Gale (1992) a supplier knows more about his ability to distort a veri…able signal of production costs. 4 task is unveri…able. Bernheim and Whinston (1998) argue that if certain elements of performance cannot be veri…ed, it may be optimal not to specify other elements in the contract which would be veri…able in principle, as this 'ambiguity'allows good performance to be rewarded.
Conformism and adherence to social norms have been studied in di¤erent ways in economics. An early paper incorporating social norms in economics is Akerlof (1980) . Bernheim (1994) models conformism by assuming that people care for social status determined by others'beliefs about one's own type, which may lead to distorted individual decisions. Lindbeck et al. (1999) assume that the embarrassment of living on public transfer is decreasing in the share of people living from the transfer. In Kandel and Lazear (1992) , Huck et al. (2003) or Fischer and Huddart (2005) members of a team su¤er a utility loss when their own e¤ort level falls short of that of their co-workers. Empirical evidence on the importance of conformism in organizations has for instance been found by Ichino and Maggi (2000) who observe a signi…cant positive relationship between a job mover's absenteeism and the average absenteeism of his co-workers in a large Italian bank. 8
The Model
A risk-neutral principal employs an agent. The agent's e¤ort generates a payo¤ A for the agent and P for the principal. The agent can be one of three di¤erent types. First, there are sel…sh agents who care only about their own well-being, hence, the utility function of a sel…sh type is given by u S = U S ( A ). Second, there are trustworthy fair agents who have some form of a social preference, i.e. they also care to some extent for the principal's payo¤ such that their utility function is u F = U F ( A ; P ). We call these two types the steadfast agents as their moral convictions are …xed from the outset. The fraction of fair agents among the steadfasts is given by ; but there is uncertainty about this fraction, hence is drawn from some prior distribution.
But we assume that there is also a third group, which we call the conformists. A conformist is someone who is uncertain about the 'appropriate' behavior in a certain situation and therefore is in ‡uenced by social norms.
If for instance a conformist harms someone else to gain a personal advantage he will su¤er from remorse only if he believes that many others would also feel bad about the harmful action. We model this in the following way: a conformist will have some form of a social preference if and only if he believes that su¢ ciently many of the other steadfast agents also do. We assume that the utility of a conformist U C ( A ; P ) is equal to U F ( A ; P ) if he believes that the median steadfast agent is fair (i.e. if his conditional expectation on is larger than 1 2 ) and equal to U S ( A ) otherwise. 9 As an employer the principal will typically have learned more from the behavior of previous or other current employees. 10 For simplicity, we assume that she learns the fraction of fair agents which is either L or H . We focus on the interesting cases where this signal is informative and would a¤ect the preferences of a conformist given that he is able to infer it in the game, i.e.
L . The fraction of conformists in the population may not be perfectly known but has mean according to the common prior expectation.
The timing of the game is as follows: …rst the principal learns her private signal and decides whether to trust or to control the agent 2 fT; Cg.
Afterwards, the agent chooses an e¤ort level e which a¤ects the principal's as well as his own material payo¤ such that P = P ( ; e) and A = A ( ; e).
This game is a signaling game as the principal's choice may reveal her private information.
Note that a conformist's action choice will always correspond exactly to either that of a steadfastly sel…sh or to that of a steadfastly fair type depending on his beliefs about . Hence, the principal's continuation payo¤ which we denote by depends only on the principal's decision and on whether the agent acts fairly (then = F ) or sel…shly ( = S ).
We will …rst derive a general result and then consider two special cases within this framework. However, these applications share common properties which we use to derive the key result at the outset:
Hence, the game is in a very simple way a psychological game in the sense of Geanakoplos et al. (1989) , as players' payo¤s are not only a¤ected by what they do but also by what they believe.
1 0 For instance large …rms have software systems that track performance across di¤erent locations. In the subsection 6.2 we show that this can easily be endogenized in a two-period version of the model with multiple agents. 
The Existence of a Separating Equilibrium
Of course, in some situations the fairness of an agent does not matter too much for the principal, for instance when control is very e¤ective. When SC > F T the principal earns more from a controlled sel…sh agent than from a trusted trustworthy agent. Then clearly trust can never be optimal even when it favorably a¤ects conformists'behavior.
However, when this is not the case, it may be attractive for a principal to choose trust as this may signal her conviction that most agents are fair.
But note that she has to trade o¤ two e¤ects against each other: On the one hand, she will be better o¤ when conformists become trustworthy. But on the other hand, there are also steadfastly sel…sh agents around and these agents will exert lower e¤ort levels when being trusted.
Trust will be a credible signal when an "optimistic" principal who has received a high signal trusts and a "pessimistic"principal prefers to control the agent. We have to check whether the principal has an incentive to follow this strategy when the agents believe that trust is indeed a credible signal. If is the principal's subjective probability that a steadfast agent is 1 1 For instance, Nagin et al. (2002) found in their study on call center agents that cheating behavior of those employees who have positive attitudes towards the employer varies less with the monitoring rate. The study is also an interesting example of a …rm which has superior knowldege of the cheating behavior of their agents by making control calls.
1 2 The main result given in Proposition 1 and its applications in Propositions 2 and 3 do not rely on the second part of property 3. trustworthy, her expected pro…t when controlling ( = C) is then given by
steadfastly fair agents
(1)
When she trusts, she makes losses from the steadfastly sel…sh agents as they would work harder when being controlled. But she gains as the conformists become fair. Her expected pro…ts from trusting are
steadfastly fair agents (2) Comparing these two expressions and solving for yields that the principal will trust when the fraction of conformists is larger than a cut-o¤ valuê
This cut-o¤ value is decreasing in as higher values of imply a lower expected fraction of steadfastly sel…sh agents who betray the principal's trust which makes trusting less costly. Using these considerations, we can derive:
Proposition 1 Given that F T SC a separating equilibrium exists in which the principal trusts after he has received the good signal and controls after the bad if and only if the fraction of conformists
It is important to note that the equilibrium exists even though controlling the agent is a dominant strategy under full information. As we have shown, trust may nonetheless be bene…cial as it can be a credible signal of a social norm and therefore a¤ect conformists'behavior.
Note that a precondition for the existence of the equilibrium is that there are neither too few nor too many conformists: 13 when there are only a few conformists even an optimistic principal prefers to control the agents.
1 3 In subsection 6.1 all pure strategy equilibria are derived. As is shown there, the separating equilibrium is the unique pure strategy equilibrium in this range when
it coexists with a pooling equilibrium in which the principal always controls.
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The higher the fraction of conformists, the more attractive it is to signal optimism about the social norm. But when there are too many conformists even a pessimistic principal would want to imitate this signal and then of course it would no longer be credible.
Incentives and Identi…cation
This application is concerned with the possible impact of a compensation scheme on employees'identi…cation with the objectives of a …rm. Consider a situation in which an agent always earns a base wage w. A principal can choose whether to give an unconditional wage increase of 0 (then she 'trusts') or introduce a piece rate 1 (then she 'controls'). 14 The principal's revenue is equal to the e¤ort e exerted by the agent at cost c (e) = c 2 e 2 . Hence, when the principal trusts A (T; e) = w + c (e) and P (T; e) = e w whereas when she controls A (C; e) = w+ e c (e) and P (C; e) = e (1 ) w.
Adopting the terminology of Akerlof and Kranton (2005) the steadfast agents are either sel…sh 'outsiders' or trustworthy 'insiders'. Sel…sh outsiders care only for their own well-being and hence U S ( A ( ; e)) = A ( ; e).
Trustworthy insiders, however, also identify to some extent with the wellbeing of their employer U F ( A ( ; e) ; P ( ; e)) = A ( ; e) + P ( ; e) :
The higher , the stronger the identi…cation with the objectives of the organization. Whether conformists act as insiders or as outsiders now depends upon their beliefs about the prevailing social norm, i.e. their beliefs about updated following the observation of the principal's choice of a compensation scheme.
First, it is instructive to consider an insider's objective function when the piece rate has been chosen. She maximizes w + e c 2 e 2 + ((1 ) e w).
From the …rst order condition we obtain the reaction function
Hence, insiders respond to incentives, but an insider's optimal e¤ort choice is less sensitive to the power of the incentive scheme as compared to an outsider's (with = 0). It is straightforward to check that properties 1 and 2 are always satis…ed. Property 3, which requires that control is preferred when the agent's type is known, holds if the piece rate is not too large for a given . 15 From Proposition 1 we can directly infer that a separating equilibrium may indeed exist in which the principal prefers to raise the …xed wage instead of using the piece rate. But for a given fraction of conformists, we can also use the result to formulate requirements for a salary increase such that it is a credible signal of the …rm's con…dence that most employees are trustworthy:
Proposition 2 An optimistic principal can credibly signal trust by raising the …xed salary instead of paying the piece rate when the salary increase
This set is non-empty if (1 ) and if the fraction of conformists is su¢ ciently large.
Proof: See Appendix.
Raising the …xed wage instead of paying the piece rate is costly as sel…sh outsiders exert less e¤ort. But it can be bene…cial as conformists become insiders when the wage increase is a credible signal of the principal's con…-dence. Signaling this con…dence becomes possible as an optimistic principal su¤ers less from not setting incentives. However, if there are many conformists the signal may not be credible as a pessimistic principal may want to imitate the signal. This e¤ect is prevented when the "costs of trust" are raised by increasing the …xed salary. Hence, it may indeed be the case that performance pay crowds out motivation but performance-independent payments support a "crowding in".
The result is illustrated in Figure 1 . The proportion of conformists is drawn on the abscissa and the wage increase on the ordinate. If is below the upper boundary for a given , an optimistic principal chooses a …xed wage when this turns conformists into trustworthy insiders. If it is below the lower boundary a pessimistic principal would do the same. The larger the fraction of conformists the more attractive it is to signal trust. From a more general perspective, the introduction of an incentive scheme has two e¤ects which the employer has to trade-o¤ against each other: it has an incentive e¤ ect as even employees who do not identify with the objectives of the organization work harder. But there may also be a crowding-out e¤ ect as it may reveal that not identifying with the goals of the organization is a widespread behavior.
Trust and Restrictions
The preconditions for our set-up -costly e¤ort choices and uncertainty about the behavior of others -typically hold for most economic laboratory experiments. We therefore apply our framework to a recent experiment by Falk and Kosfeld (forthcoming) . In this experiment a principal had the binary choice of whether to impose a lower boundary r 2 f0; Rg on the set of feasible e¤ort levels. An agent then chose an e¤ort e 2 [r; K] resulting in a payo¤ of 2e for the principal and K e for the agent.
If all agents were sel…sh they would never choose positive e¤ort levels and principals would always impose the restriction. As Falk and Kosfeld already lay out in their paper, principals will also impose a restriction if not all are sel…sh but some agents care for fairness in the sense that they are 1 6 Note that the precondition for the existence of such an equilibrium
(1 ) holds irrespectively of when . inequity averse. By imposing a restriction, the principal can protect herself against sel…sh agents without altering the inequity averse agents'e¤ort choices. But Falk and Kosfeld surprisingly found that average e¤orts chosen in the experiment with anonymous one-shot interaction were signi…cantly higher when principals did not impose a restriction.
We now also assume that agents can be sel…sh U S ( A ) = A or inequity averse with Fehr and Schmidt (1999) -type utility functions such that
In addition we allow for the possibility that agents are conformists who care for fairness if and only if su¢ ciently many steadfast agents do so. We will show that this yields a straightforward theoretical explanation for the striking experimental result.
A sel…sh agent will always choose the lowest possible e¤ort level. Without restriction an inequity averse agent chooses 17 e = arg max e K e v ((K e) (2e)) .
As long as e R he will do the same when a restriction is imposed. It is straightforward that the game always satis…es the properties 1-3 laid out above. Using Proposition 1 we obtain the following:
Proposition 3 When e > R and if the fraction of conformists is neither too small nor too large a separating equilibrium exists in which the principal imposes no restriction if and only if she received the good signal. In this equilibrium the observed average e¤ ort levels are higher when no restriction is imposed.
Hence, not imposing the restriction can be a credible signal of the principal's con…dence that many agents are indeed fair: it is costly as unfair agents work less but these costs are smaller when the principal is optimistic 1 7 For instance, when an agent becomes "in…nitely inequity averse" e ! K 3 as this equalizes the principal's and agent's payo¤. In the baseline experiment many people indeed chose e = K 3 = 40; which is well above R = 10. and this may make signaling possible. Hence, our approach yields a possible explanation for the experimental results. 18 Falk and Kosfeld themselves argue verbally that the results are driven by what they call distrust aversion, i.e. that an agent dislikes being distrusted by another player and responds by choosing lower e¤ort levels when a restriction is imposed. However, note that the experiment was anonymous, i.e. principals and agents did not meet. Hence, a principal choosing a restriction did not distrust this agent in person as agents were randomly assigned and she did not know with which agent she was playing. Hence, the choice of a restriction rather conveyed a principal's trust in the distribution of types among all participants in the experiment and not her trust in the particular agent, which is well in line with our approach. 19 5 Trust and Employee Self-Selection So far we have studied a model in which an employer's decision on whether to trust or to control her employees only has an impact on the moral convictions of a given set of employees. But of course such a decision will also a¤ect the attractiveness of the job and, hence, the selection of agents working for the …rm. To analyze such selection e¤ects of trust in a simple way, we extend our framework by assuming that the principal initially employs a continuum of agents indexed by i 2 [0; 1], drawn from some larger population. After having received a signal about the fraction of fair agents among the steadfasts the principal decides on whether to trust or to control the agents. As before, the agents then update their beliefs about based on the principal's decision. But now we add an additional stage at which the agents receive outside o¤ers and leave the …rm when these o¤ers yield higher utility levels than staying with the …rm. The utility level u i generated by these offers is a random variable characterized by a cumulative distribution function F S (u i ) for a sel…sh and F F (u i ) for a fair type. Conformists fall into these 1 8 The result can also be generalized by allowing for the possibility that principal and agent receive di¤erent but equally precise signals about the fraction of fair agents in advance.
1 9 Recently, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2005) also gave a theoretical explanation for the experimental results. Their explanation is driven by agents'preferences for the principal's esteem which also seems problematic due to the anonymity of interaction in the experiment.
13 categories according to their beliefs on . For simplicity, we assume that when being trusted all agents prefer to stay with the organization. 20 When being controlled the continuation utility of a fair agent who stays with the …rm is U F C and that of a sel…sh agent is U SC . As we want to investigate the costs of employing sel…sh agents in a simple way, we furthermore assume that the principal makes losses with any sel…sh agent working for the …rm, i.e. ST ; SC < 0. Now, the decision whether to trust or to control employees not only a¤ects conformists moral convictions but also the overall distribution of types in the organization. We investigate two cases. Either the conformists' convictions are a¤ected by their beliefs about the distribution of types in the whole population or they consider only the type distribution among their colleagues within the organization they work for.
Population Norms
Here we assume that conformists are fair if and only if they believe that the median steadfast agent in the population is fair. We again check whether a separating equilibrium can exist in which trust is a credible signal of a favorable social norm. Suppose that this would be the case. The principal's expected pro…t when controlling ( = C) then becomes
and when she trusts ( = T ) she earns
When the principal controls, sel…sh types leave the organization but fair types may also quit. Whereas the former e¤ect is bene…cial, the latter is costly for the principal. Hence, these selection e¤ects create an additional trade-o¤ which has to be taken into account by the principal.
We can again proceed as in subsection 4.1 by comparing these two expressions and solving for . We obtain that the principal prefers to trust 2 0 This assumption can be relaxed to allow for the possibility that agents also leave the …rm when being trusted. The results are for instance robust when agents of both types prefer being trusted and the fraction of the sel…sh agents who stay when the principal trusts is at least as large as that of the fair agents, which seems reasonable as the sel…sh agents typically should bene…t more from not being controlled. 14 when the fraction of conformists is larger than a cut-o¤ valuẽ
First, note that the cut-o¤ is decreasing in F S (U SC ). 21 The stronger the selection e¤ect for the sel…sh types (i.e. the smaller F S (U SC )) the higher the cut-o¤ value: control is indeed more attractive when it serves to make many sel…sh agents quit. But the cut-o¤ is increasing in F F (U F C ), i.e. trust becomes more advantageous when the selection e¤ect for the fair types is stronger.
It is important to note that irrespective of which of the two e¤ects dominates, trust is always bene…cial when the fraction of conformists is suf…ciently large -provided that it is a credible signal of a favorable social norm. In the following result we characterize under which conditions this will be the case:
Proposition 4 If the fraction of fair agents staying with the …rm when being controlled F F (U F C ) is su¢ ciently large, that is if
a separating equilibrium exists in which the principal trusts after he has received the good signal and controls after the bad if and only if the fraction
Without selection e¤ects the only motive to trust the agents was to signal a favorable work norm. Now trust can also become bene…cial without the signaling motive if control drives away too many of the fair agents. Condition (6) is equivalent to the requirement that~ ( L ) > 0. If the condition is not met, the selection e¤ect for the fair types is very strong relative to that for the sel…sh types. In that case, the principal will always choose to trust irrespective of the proportion of conformists and his signal. But in turn, trust is then no longer a credible signal of a favorable work norm.
2 1 To see this, note that~ ( ) =
: 15 Condition (6) for instance always holds when F F (U F C ) = 1; i.e. when all fair types stay with the …rm when being controlled. This is for instance reasonable for the application on imposing restrictions considered in subsection 4.3. In that case fair agents are indi¤erent between being controlled or trusted as they choose the same e¤ort level in both cases. The selection e¤ect then only drives away the sel…sh types, which of course makes control attractive. But as the result shows, the separating equilibrium still exists in which an optimistic principal credibly signals trust if the fraction of conformists is neither too large nor too small. Of course, the selection e¤ect increases the opportunity costs of trust and hence the signaling costs. On the one hand, this makes signaling harder as trust is less attractive for an optimistic principal. But it also makes it easier, as trusting becomes less attractive for a pessimistic principal, which strengthens the credibility of the signal.
Organization-Speci…c Norms
It is also interesting to investigate the case where conformists follow the social preferences only of their fellow employees within the particular organization they work for. To study this we now assume that conformists become fair when they believe that the median fellow employee in the considered organization is fair. Note that the decision on whether to trust or to control now a¤ects the conformists'preferences in two ways. As before, there may be a signaling e¤ect as the principal's superior information on the distribution of types may be revealed. But in addition, there is now also a direct e¤ect on the social norm as the decision alters the composition of the workforce.
Note that the distribution of types in the organization remains unchanged when the principal trusts her employees. But when she controls them the proportion of fair agents among the steadfasts in the organization becomes
This proportion is larger than the population share whenever F F (U F C ) > F S (U SC ) ; i.e. when control turns away more sel…sh agents than fair ones.
As it seems reasonable that sel…sh agents su¤er more from being controlled, we assume that this is indeed the case.
As before, we check whether a separating equilibrium exists in which trusts is a credible signal of a favorable norm. If this is the case the conformists will again be fair when being trusted. But when being controlled they now become sel…sh only if for = L expression (7) is smaller than a half, which is equivalent to
When condition (8) holds, the organization-speci…c norm is identical to the population norm and we can directly apply the results from proposition 4 and show that trust may again be a credible signal.
But this is not necessarily the case. Condition (8) does not hold when the selection e¤ect for the sel…sh agents is very strong relative to that for the fair agents. In this case control actually leads the conformists to become fair. The principal's decision then becomes a pure selection decision as the conformists are fair irrespective of her choice. When for instance F F (U F C ) = 1 such that fair agents always stay with the organization it is straightforward to see that the principal would always prefer to control 22 and the separating equilibrium can no longer exist.
The reason for this result is that here control repels so many sel…sh agents that the fair agents constitute a majority within the organization even when the share of steadfastly fair agents in the initial population is small. This e¤ect hints at a possible bene…t of control in organizations: when conformist employees follow the behavior of their direct colleagues rather than being in ‡uenced by the ethics of society as a whole, control may strengthen the work norm in the organization. An important precondition for this e¤ect is of course that employees with a high work ethic do not care about being controlled but control drives most sel…sh employees away. When this is not the case, trust can still be bene…cial as a credible signal of a favorable work norm.
Further Analysis and Extensions
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Pooling Equilibria
We now return to the initial set-up and investigate all other feasible purestrategy equilibria. It is straightforward that there is no separating equilibrium in which an optimistic principal distrusts and a pessimistic principal trusts. In a pooling equilibrium agents do not learn anything from the principal's choice. The conformists'behavior then depends on the common prior belief about the social norm.
When according to public information the norm is to be trustworthy
) the conformists will remain trustworthy in equilibrium. In this case there will always be a pooling equilibrium in which the principal controls whatever her private information as control will not be perceived as a signal of pessimism about the social norm. But when the fraction of conformists is very large, another pooling equilibrium exists in which the principal always trusts. To see the latter, note that control is in this case a deviation from the equilibrium path. Such an equilibrium can be sustained if the agents believe after a deviation that the principal is pessimistic, and if even a pessimistic principal then prefers to trust which is the case when ^ ( L ). We can conclude: 24
Proposition 5 But when according to the public information most steadfast agents are sel…sh (E [ ] < ), always trusting cannot be an optimal strategy as trust is then no signal of optimism about the norm. However, neither is always controlling an equilibrium strategy in many cases when we require intuitively plausible beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path as the following result shows :
there is never a pooling equilibrium in which the principal always trusts.
(ii) Given that the intuitive criterion is applied, a pooling equilibrium in which the principal always controls exists if and only if the fraction of conformists
The key intuition for this result is as follows: Suppose there would be a pooling equilibrium in which the principal always controls. An optimistic principal would prefer to deviate and trust when this makes conformists trustworthy if the fraction of conformists is not too small (i.e. when ^ ( H )). But when this fraction is not too large (i.e. when ^ ( L )), a pessimistic principal is always better o¤ sticking to the equilibrium strategy.
Hence, it is implausible to believe that the principal received the bad signal when she trusts and this makes the deviation for the optimistic principal
attractive. An important consequence of this result is that the separating equilibrium we analyzed in Proposition 1 is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium in this case.
The Principal' s Prior
So far we assumed that the principal has superior information about . To endogenize this, consider a model in which the principal employs a continuum of agents indexed by i 2 [0; 1] in two periods t = 1; 2. Now we assume that principal and agents initially do not know the fraction of fair agents among the steadfasts which is either H or L with given probabilities where H > L . Hence, in contrast to the basic model principal and agents are symmetrically informed at the outset. Furthermore, we assume that all know the fraction of conformists.
At the beginning of each period t the principal decides whether to trust or to control the agents t 2 fT; Cg and each agent chooses his e¤ort level e t (i)
leading to a pro…t for the principal of t (i). Only the principal observes the aggregate performance of all agents after each period
The atomistic agents do not have a strategic motive in period 1 as an individual agent's e¤ort choice has no impact on the principal's second-period decision. As before, pro…ts from individual agents therefore take only two values depending on the principal's decision t , either F t or S t . The pro…t generated by a conformist, which we denote by C , is either F t or S t depending on the prior beliefs about . But then the principal can infer the behavior of the conformists. Hence, after period 1 she perfectly learns from observing aggregate pro…ts as
Each agent knows that the principal can infer after the …rst period and therefore is aware of her superior information in the second. But then the second-period equilibrium analysis proceeds exactly as in the single-agent model above, where the probabilities in equations (2) and (1) now denote the mass of steadfastly fair, steadfastly sel…sh and conformist agents respectively.
Optimal Incentive Schemes
In subsection 4.2 we assumed that the principal chooses between two given contracts. Now we show that the key result carries over to a case where she can choose a contract (w; ) 2 R 2 and the agent responds by exerting e¤ort level e. 25 The agent is protected by limited liability. For simplicity we therefore assume that his monetary income must always exceed a reservation income normalized to 0.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is characterized by a pair of contracts (w s ; s ) for each of the principal's signals (s = L; H), the conformist's beliefs about for each possible contract choice, and the di¤erent types' e¤ort choices given their beliefs and the o¤ered contract. Suppose now that a separating equilibrium exists in which the principal chooses two di¤erent contracts depending on her signal. When o¤ering (w L ; L ) the agents infer that she has received the bad signal and conformists will act as outsiders.
The expected fraction of insiders is then (1 ) L and the contract o¤ered by a pessimistic principal is uniquely determined: it consists of a …xed wage 2 5 Note that we do not investigate screening here as only a single contract can be o¤ered. A justifaction for this is that typically, …rms o¤er the same type of contract to employees who perform the same function. But even with screening a signaling e¤ect may arise as the optimal menu will depend on the principal's beliefs about the type distribution. 20 of w L = 0 and a piece rate L solving
which is equal to
But using this L ; the conditions derived in Proposition 2 also characterize all …xed-wage contracts o¤ered by an optimistic principal that can be sustained in a separating equilibrium. 26 To see this note the following: If a certain …xed wage contract can be sustained in equilibrium, it will always be sustainable with the worst possible beliefs of the agent after any deviation o¤ the equilibrium path, i.e. when agents then believe that the principal has received the bad signal. Hence, contract (w H ; 0) is part of a separating equilibrium whenever (i) an optimistic principal's is better o¤ with this contract when conformists become insiders than with (0; L ) when they remain outsiders as all other feasible deviations are dominated by the latter and (ii) a pessimistic principal prefers the incentive scheme (0; L ) to the …xed-wage contract. But this is exactly what is checked in Proposition 2.
Conclusion
From a more general perspective our model may yield some insights on the notion of trust. Trust can be straightforwardly de…ned in social preference frameworks: trust in a transaction partner is the belief that this transaction partner has social preferences with a su¢ ciently high probability instead of being sel…sh. But as experiments have shown, trust seems to a¤ect the trustworthiness of the transaction partner, which cannot be explained by distributional theories of social preferences alone.
Our model suggests the following mechanism for this phenomenon: not trusting a person reveals your belief that there is a danger that this person is sel…sh and will choose a harmful action. A reason for distrusting someone is that you have had a bad experience in a similar situation before and therefore you are pessimistic about the trustworthiness of your counterpart. In the model we applied a notion of social norms where the norm does not specify a particular action but a more general rule of behavior forming the intentions behind the chosen action. However, there is also the di¤erent view that social norms de…ne speci…c actions chosen by individuals in a reference group. 28 We can model this in our framework in a very simple 2 7 Very roughly, cognitive evaluation theory (see for instance Deci and Porac (1978) ) posits that monetary rewards undermine self-determination and therefore the joy of performing a task. According to self-perception theories individuals imperfectly know their preferences and incentives may lead individuals to conclude that they perform an activity because of those incentives (see Lepper and Greene (1978) ).
2 8 Hence, in the …rst approach the norm is "to be fair" whereas in the second it requires to choose a particular e¤ort level. Recent experimental evidence (see for instance Charness and Rabin (2002) , Falk et al. (2000) ) suggests that learning about other people's intentions indeed a¤ects decisions even if the material consequences remain unchanged.
The intention or type-based approach is related to Bernheim (1994) 's model of conformism where individuals care for others' actions only indirectly as these actions reveal something about their type. The action-based approach is closer to peer pressure in team models such as Kandel and Lazear (1992). way by assuming that a conformist's utility is always maximized when his e¤ort level is equal to the e¤ort level chosen by the median agent. When conformists consider only the actions of the steadfast agents, a separating equilibrium then exists under the same conditions as given in Proposition 1.
When conformists consider the whole population (including their fellow conformists) there are typically multiple equilibria at the e¤ort stage and di¤erent norms can be stable. The conformists play a coordination game if neither the steadfastly fair nor the steadfastly sel…sh agents constitute a majority. However, a simple re…nement again establishes the separating equilibrium laid out above: suppose that the expected behavior of the median steadfast agent forms a focal point and the equilibrium e¤ort level is selected accordingly. Then the best response of each individual conformist will be to put in the fair e¤ort when he is trusted and the sel…sh e¤ort level when he is controlled. The mass of agents choosing the respective action will indeed always form a majority. Hence, an employer's choice of whether to trust or to control may guide the coordination on a work norm in a team. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
We know that for a given the principal will trust i¤ ^ ( ) ; where noŵ
) :
the denominator of the second term is always positive as max (2 ) = 1.
Hence, this condition is equivalent to
(1 ) c :
Therefore the separating equilibrium exists i¤ is in the given interval.
Both boundaries intersect at
(1 ) c when = 1. Each is linearly increasing in and the slope of each is larger, the smaller . Hence, the set is non-empty as long as the upper boundary exceeds 0, which is always the case when is large enough and (1 ).
Proof of Proposition 3:
The …rst part follows directly from Proposition 1. The expected e¤ort level without restriction is ( + (1 ) H ) e in the separating equilibrium. With a restriction it is (1 (1 ) L ) R + (1 ) L e . But
where the …rst inequality follows as the optimistic principal prefers to trust in the separating equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4:
This cut-o¤~ ( ) given by (5) is strictly decreasing in ; when F S (U SC ) SC ST > F F (U F C ) F C F T . As
this is always the case. Hence, the separating equilibrium will exist whenever are strictly positive.~ ( ) is strictly positive for a given when
Note that the right hand side is smaller than 1 when
which always holds as ST < F S (U SC ) SC < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6:
A pooling equilibrium where the principal always controls exists when the agent believes o¤ the equilibrium path that the principal received the low signal. But these beliefs may be ruled out by the intuitive criterion: when the principal received L her equilibrium payo¤ is
as all conformists are sel…sh. However, the highest possible payo¤ when deviating to trust is
The equilibrium payo¤ after L exceeds the highest feasible payo¤ when deviating, whenever ^ ( L ). Hence, in this case a deviation is equilibriumdominated for a pessimistic principal and will then lead the agents to believe in a high signal. An optimistic principal will therefore choose trust whenever ^ ( H ).
25
